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# The United States in United Nations military operations

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**The United States  
in United Nations Military Operations**

by

**Robert W. Poor**  
Lieutenant, United States Navy  
B.S., United States Naval Academy, 1985

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for  
the degree of

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from the

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## **ABSTRACT**

This thesis examines the role of the United States in United Nations military operations. In a future that will likely include more instances of U.N. security operations and a U.S. military having to make do with less resources, collective security operations are a logical choice for U.S. decision-makers. The study begins with a discussion of six types of U.N. military operations, ranging in intensity from humanitarian aid to enforcement and punishment. The study also provides a decision model that accounts for the effects of elite and popular consensus domestically and internationally on the collective security process; Iraq and Bosnia act as illustrative examples. The study then examines the roles played by the U.S. Navy and intelligence community in collective security. In summary, the study concludes that the U.S. military is best suited for operations at either extreme of the collective spectrum. In other instances, limited action by the U.S. Navy or intelligence community are viable alternatives.

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This study begins by discussing six levels of U.N. military operations, ranging from most peaceful to most violent: level 1 *humanitarian aid*, level 2 *separation of forces*, level 3 *law and order*, level 4 *use of limited force*, level 5 *enforcement*, and level 6 *punishment*. Briefly, *humanitarian aid* missions need almost no force, level 2 *separation of forces* and level 3 *law and order* require minimal force, level 4 *use of limited force* provides for just that, and level 5 *enforcement* and level 6 *punishment*, at least in the Gulf War, allow for "all means necessary."

*Humanitarian aid* may be broken into three types:

- a host nation extends an invitation for assistance,
- assistance is given against the wishes of host,
- a host nation's civil authority has evaporated.

Providing *humanitarian aid* of the first type need not be explained further. However, the second and third instances are more controversial. It is in the U.S.'s best interests to be sensitive to the concerns of developing nations, who are acutely aware of threats to their national sovereignty and international prestige. The U.N. already contains a group of nations who regularly perform *peacekeeping*

operations; these last two types of *humanitarian aid* seem best left to them--likewise, the "middle" levels of U.N. military operations described below.

*Separation of forces* is the traditional peacekeeping mission. *Law and order* missions, which have been authorized only rarely in the past, guarantee the integrity of a government whose authority has evaporated. In the future, if the United Nations becomes more involved in nations' internal disputes, peacekeepers will require more forceful means. Therefore, the *use of limited force*, a likely new peacekeeping category, may gain in prominence.

At the extreme of collective security are *enforcement* and *punishment* operations, in which the United States military has participated twice, responding to North Korean aggression in 1950 and Iraqi aggression in 1990.

A military action may be conducted unilaterally, under the umbrella of the United Nations, or within a regional security organization. By considering factors such as elite and popular consensus internationally and domestically, this study provides a decision-making model to help determine which operational structure is most prudent.

Often regional crises fall into "gray" areas which may necessitate some form of partial action by the U.S. In these situations, U.S. Navy and intelligence community assets are "low-risk, high-reward" ways to provide support



for humanitarian aid and the "middle" levels of United Nations military operations (*separation of forces, law and order, and use of limited force*) without significantly intruding on the host nation's sovereignty.

In summary, this thesis concludes the following:

- The U.S., as the world's supreme military power, is best suited for United Nations military operations at either extreme of the collective spectrum.
- A group of the world's secondary military powers have, over the nearly fifty years of the United Nations, created a *peacekeeping* culture, tradition, and reputation. These countries remain best suited for participation in the "middle" forms of collective operations: *humanitarian aid* under difficult conditions, *separation of forces, law and order*, and the *use of limited force*.
- Often, non-military pressures require that some U.S. effort be taken in response to regional crises. Elite and popular consensus internationally and domestically for a military action will result in the U.S. military's doing *something*: most likely, a partial participation.
- The U.S. Navy is a "low-risk, high-reward" means of providing support to the entire spectrum of United Nations military operations, including those levels in the "middle." Naval vessels are flexible, have a high degree of "unilateralness," and may provide temporary control or a long-term presence in an area to project power ashore or simply to aid resupply of ground forces.
- Another form of partial participation may be filled by the U.S. intelligence community. Monitoring events and information-sharing at either extreme of the collective spectrum seem particularly straightforward.
- For the "middle" collective operations, the mandate for U.S. intelligence is less clear. However, after considering the importance of the U.S. interests at stake and the discretion of the head of the United Nations agency or mission involved, U.S. intelligence support is another "low-risk, high-reward" activity.



## I. INTRODUCTION

In the Gulf we caught a glimmer of a better future--a new world community brought together by a growing consensus that force cannot be used to settle disputes and that when that consensus is broken, the world will respond. In the Gulf, we saw the United Nations playing the role dreamed by its founders, with the world's leading nations orchestrating and sanctioning collective action against aggression.

President Bush, 1991

More than any other lesson learned during the Gulf War, perhaps the most surprising is that the United Nations Security Council is "beginning to act as it was designed, freed from the superpower antagonisms that often frustrated consensus, less hobbled by the ritualistic anti-Americanism that so often weakened its credibility." [Ref. 1; 50] As East-West tensions fade and the Security Council starts to carry out its mandate to preserve peace, concurrently the United States military prepares to accept considerable reductions in its budget. Although the military budget will drop by at least twenty-five percent over the next few years [Ref. 2; A13], the United States's political and economic interests continue to stretch around the globe. It seems prudent, then, to reexamine the initial goals and objectives of the *Charter of the United Nations* and explore those conditions under which the United States military should

contribute to operations under the auspices of the United Nations.

While Jeanne Kirkpatrick reasonably asserts "it is probably not yet safe for democracies to vest the definition of the most fundamental rights of citizens in the votes of an international body, most of whose members still do not enjoy such rights," [Ref. 3; A9] the new, more pragmatic atmosphere of the United Nations Security Council suggests the potential for even more collective participation in global crises in the future. The Gulf War may be an ill-fitting prototype, with its obvious aggressor whose actions had potentially enormous global economic repercussions that translated easily into clearcut objectives for the United Nations. But

(t)he Gulf Crisis did, however, demonstrate both the possibility of the international use of force and the limitations of such a use of force. It also provided a useful measure of the strength and weakness of the United Nations, and especially of the Security Council. [Ref. 4; 19]

At the 1988 Nobel Peace Prize ceremony, Sir Brian Urquhart, then United Nations Under-Secretary-General in charge of peacekeeping, said the following:

The rigors of the Cold War no longer paralyze the United Nations. It even seems possible humanity could take the great step forward towards a community of nations. [Ref. 5; D2]

Although a global "community of nations" is at best a long-distant goal, even before the Gulf War the end of the Cold War contributed to a considerable revitalization of the United Nations Security Council. After the 1978 deployment of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), more than ten years elapsed before another United Nations peacekeeping operation commenced. In 1988 and 1989 alone, the United Nations Security Council began five new peacekeeping operations, raising the number of "blue-helmeted" peacekeeping soldiers by one-third, to about 14,000. [Ref. 6; E2] Forces were dispatched to Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq border, Angola, Namibia and Central America. "This doubled, in two years, the number of operations in the field, a striking increase when it is remembered that only thirteen such operations had been established during the previous 40 years." [Ref. 7; xv] Recent initiatives relating to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Somalia and Cambodia suggest the future will include even more intense and varied operations.

Additionally, the more cooperative atmosphere within the Security Council is rubbing off on the General Assembly, encouraging the Third World majority there "to drop its anti-Western polemics in favor of consensus." [Ref. 8; E3] However, as will be discussed further in Chapter III of this study, this consensus has limitations. In the late 1970s,

when Daniel Patrick Moynihan wrote a book describing his tenure as the United States representative, he described the United Nations as "a dangerous place." [Ref. 9] Ten years later, then U.S. permanent representative to the United Nations Thomas Pickering more charitably called it "a useful place." [Ref. 10; A6] But the potential exists that East-West tensions could be replaced by a North-South split between industrialized and developing nations. As a reporter for *The New York Times* recently wrote,

(p)oorer nations struggling to bring their economic difficulties to center stage at the United Nations are blocked by the United States, which believes that development springs from domestic policies, not international action. [Ref. 10; A6]

While perhaps overstated, his point remains clear: for the first time in the Council's history the five permanent members have started to work regularly together for the solution of major problems, achieving impressive results; but this new hegemony understandably "arouses the suspicions of Third World countries, who fear that the organization will become an instrument for imposing the views of the northern industrialized nations on the developing south." [Ref. 8; E3]

## A. THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

The Third World's concern about an expanded role for the Security Council has both a psychological and a legal basis. The Third World, sensitive to perceived "colonialism" by the industrialized nations, holds most of the 178 General Assembly seats, yet has none of the five permanent Security Council positions. Similarly, the Third World may remain hostile toward intervention because it implies

the existence of a hierarchy of states in fundamental conflict with the principle that all independent states are legally sovereign and equal. Ex-colonial states, in particular, resent an institution that appears to confer special rights on major Powers in the interests of international order. To many non-aligned states intervention smacks of neo-colonialism and imperialism.  
[Ref. 11; 120]

Additionally, countries such as India and Brazil legitimately may be considered regional superpowers, yet are only occasionally one of the ten non-permanent members of the Security Council.<sup>1</sup> Similarly, Germany and Japan are clearly global economic superpowers but are virtually relegated to a Third World status regarding international

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<sup>1</sup> Brazil was a non-permanent member of the Security Council during 1946-7, 1951-2, 1954-5, 1963-4, 1967-8, and 1988-9; India was (is) a non-permanent member during 1950-1, 1967-8, 1972-3, 1977-8, 1984-5 and 1991-2.



security issues.<sup>2</sup> In June 1992, Japan amended its constitution to allow for a military role in future global crises. Previously, Japan "informally proposed the creation of six new permanent Council seats that would not have a veto." [Ref. 12; E3] However, the permanent members of the Security Council probably regard any change to its structure as unwise, especially considering that the Council is "finally operating in an effective manner . . . therefore now is the worst time to be tampering with it." [Ref. 13; A6] Legally, the Charter clearly states the limitations on the powers of the United Nations.

#### **1. Purposes and Principles of the United Nations**

In *Chapter I of the Charter of the United Nations*, the tension between international intervention and national sovereignty becomes readily apparent. For example, *Article 1* lists the following purposes for the United Nations:

1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace.
2. To develop friendly relations among nations.
3. To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character.

---

<sup>2</sup> Japan was (is) a non-permanent member of the Security Council during 1958-9, 1966-7, 1971-2, 1981-2, 1987-8 and 1992-3. West Germany (Federal Republic of Germany) was a member of the council during 1977-8 and 1987-8, and East Germany (German Democratic Republic) was a member from 1980-1.

4. To be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.

Significantly, *Article 2*, which lists seven principles for the achievement of the above purposes, specifically states, "Nothing contained in the present charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state."

## **2. Peacekeeping**

The maintenance of international peace and security is the primary goal of the United Nations. [Ref. 14; 286] The Preamble, the Purposes, and the Principles state this aim. In attempting to achieve that goal, one of the most visible United Nations activities has been the establishment of peacekeeping forces in trouble spots throughout the world. [Ref. 14; 286] And yet, the subject of *peacekeeping* forces is not specifically addressed in the United Nations Charter. Rather,

. . . peacekeeping evolved as a technique for controlling dangerous regional conflicts at a time when relations between the most powerful nations were not such as to permit the Security Council to function fully in the manner envisaged in the Charter. Now . . . the world has witnessed a dramatic improvement in the ability of the Council's members--both permanent and non-permanent--to work together to help control and resolve regional conflicts. [Ref. 7; xv]

If peacekeeping was a necessity borne from the need to create new security measures during the Cold War, then the



future may hold even more new paradigms for international security. When searching for insights into future activity, it is often beneficial to search for clues in the past. As such, it is useful to discuss briefly the portions of the *Charter of the United Nations* that delineate the means by which the Security Council may attempt to "maintain international peace and security."

### **3. Intervention**

If the definition of intervention is "an act, limited in time and scope, that is directed at changing or preserving the political structure of the target state and which lies outside the ambit of normal relations among states," [Ref. 11; 101] then intervention can include not only military, but also non-military aspects. The two chapters dealing with United Nations's non-military and military peacemaking are *Chapter VI, Pacific Settlement of Disputes*, which includes Articles thirty-three through thirty-eight, and *Chapter VII, Action With Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression*, which covers articles thirty-nine through fifty-one.<sup>3</sup> Tellingly, the *Charter* articles concerning international security are written to signify a gradual

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<sup>3</sup> Dag Hammarskjöld (Sweden), the United Nations Secretary-General from 1953-61, joked that peacekeeping operations might be put in a new Chapter "Six and a Half."

escalation of United Nations intervention. In other words, an article calling for a potentially more drastic level of United Nations action is applicable only in the event that a previous, more moderate level is unsuccessful. For example, *Chapter VI, Article 33 (1)* entreats disputing nations to "seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice." Subsequently, *Article 33 (2)* states, "The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means," a more aggressive role for the international organization. If this is unsuccessful, then the "Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation" (*Article 34*) it deems may lead to international friction: an even more aggressive role. Ultimately, if an international dispute may not be settled by peaceful means, then "action" may be taken by the Security Council under the banner of *Chapter VII*.

## **B. METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION**

The importance of clarifying potential levels of action will become apparent as this study describes and determines the circumstances under which the United States should accede to or initiate a military role for the United

Nations. The study will begin with a discussion of six types of U.N. military operations, ranging in intensity from humanitarian aid to enforcement of United Nations Security Council resolutions and punishment. The "secondary" or middle categories of United Nations military roles have traditionally been filled by the world's secondary or middle-sized industrial powers. These middle categories of United Nations military operations appear to be expanding. However, while times are changing, and the Cold War constraints that have kept the superpowers (and the other permanent members of the Security Council) from participating as peacekeepers have disappeared, other remaining factors suggest the middle-sized powers are *still* best suited for these operations. Ultimately, Chapter II concludes that the United States, as a superpower and permanent member of the Security Council, is best suited for participation in the extreme forms of United Nations military operations: those that are least and most violent.

The second portion of the study will describe a paradigm for deciding whether specific circumstances exist for the use of U.S. military force under the auspices of the United Nations. This paradigm will include an examination of the domestic and international conditions necessary for the United States to participate in collective security operations. These conditions include domestic and

international elite consensus and popular support. A brief description of these factors will be included. The Gulf War and the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina will serve as illustrative models.

In the history of the United Nations, the conditions for large-scale United States military action under the auspices of the United Nations have occurred only twice. For the United States, the January 1992 version of National Military Strategy of the United States states that the fundamental objective of the country's armed forces has remained constant: "to deter aggression and, should deterrence fail, to defend the nation's vital interests against any potential foe." [Ref. 15; 6] Therefore, it seems that future United Nations military operations will more often see a partial United States participation than the massive role that occurred in the Gulf War.

Partial participation in United Nations military operations by the United States will be examined in Chapter IV and V. Chapter IV will examine the United States Navy's potentially unique roles in United Nations operations, including the enforcement of economic sanctions, arms control efforts, and logistics support to nearly all potential United Nations military and non-military operations. Chapter V will consider the role of the United States intelligence community in United Nations operations.

Finally, it is important to note several presumptions in this study. First, the study presumes that no significant additional amounts of money will be available to fund a major United Nations standing military force or permanent intelligence organization. The dynamic nature of international politics is such that the vast majority of United Nations operations probably will continue to be relatively *ad hoc*. Additionally, the study surmises that there will be no significant change to the *Charter of the United Nations* or to its institutions at least until the middle of the decade. This study also assumes the moribund Military Staff Committee, a group of senior military officers from the permanent members of the Security Council originally envisaged by the drafters of the charter to act as a unified advisory body for the "strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council," (Article 47(3)) will not be revitalized.

In studies of peacekeeping, the experts often divide the actions into two categories: peacekeeping operations and observer missions. This study will not address observer missions, which often "can do no more than act as the eyes and ears of the Security Council, investigating incidents, acting as fact finders," [Ref. 16; 120-1] since there appears little to be gained from such an effort. The discussion of peacekeeping forces generally will be confined



to the role which the United States and the other Big Five powers may take in the operations.

As the aforementioned limitations of the United Nations reveal, for the foreseeable future there will continue to be a tension between the sovereignty of nations and the interests of the global community. Far from perfect, the existing Security Council may turn out to be, like Winston Churchill's famous definition of democracy, "the worst possible mechanism for attempting to safeguard peace, except for all the others." [Ref. 12; 3]

## II. TYPOLOGY OF UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OPERATIONS

During the Gulf crisis harsh reality was accompanied by a good deal of rhetoric. There was talk of *turning points* and *defining moments*, but the phrase likely to resound the longest was the *new world order*.  
[Ref. 4; 18]

The *new world order* is not very new and certainly not very orderly.

Anonymous

Under the *Charter of the United Nations*, the United Nations Security Council has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. However, historically the United Nations has not provided a system for peace and security so much as a last resort, or safety net for warring, deadlocked belligerents. The introduction of this study presumed future United Nations military operations will remain *ad hoc*. The basic issue becomes when, in the new international climate, should the United States military accede to or initiate support for a military operation under the auspices of the United Nations.

Is an *ad hoc* security institution based on "vigilance, consensus, common interest, collective action and international law" [Ref. 4; 19] workable in the post-Cold War era? The Cold War derailed the original purposes of the United Nations, as "Soviet leaders treated the United



Nations with suspicion, seeing it as at best a platform for anti-Western propaganda, at worst an obstacle to world revolution." [Ref. 8; E3] Now, examining the rapidity and unity of the response to the recent Gulf War, in which the members of the United Nations Security Council were able to pass twelve resolutions between 2 August 1990 and 29 November 1990, suggests the United Nations as it currently exists can play a stronger, more proactive role in future global crises. By 11 October 1991, the Security Council passed twenty-three resolutions directly relating to the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, further suggesting that the United Nations is developing the wherewithal to solve problems, rather than simply comment on them.

From the United States's point of view, a viable Security Council becomes a useful means by which to protect national interests. At the same time, General Powell recently wrote "we must also retain the capability to operate independently, as our interests dictate." [Ref. 15; 9] Of course, many national interests coincide with global interests. As problems and conflicts around the world are increasingly perceived to have global implications, it seems logical that the world will turn to international organizations, particularly the United Nations, to find solutions. However, these coincidental interests traditionally are secondary to the country's vital

interests, which have not significantly changed.<sup>4</sup>

Therefore, even in an era of declining military budgets, the United States and other nations will continue to view the United Nations largely as an additional means for pursuing vital interests or a convenient means for pursuing peripheral interests. For increasingly important global concerns such as protecting the environment and human rights, eventually military forces under the auspices of the United Nations will more actively battle violators of international standards; however, continued constraints on the Security Council and the General Assembly suggest for the foreseeable future these issues will be acted upon by other than military means. As mentioned earlier, for the United States the question becomes under what circumstances should the country accede to or initiate military operations under United Nations auspices.

Just as the "different levels of conflict and their individual characteristics, ranging from full-scale war to domestic and intercommunal disputes, need to be recognized by those concerned with conflict abatement and resolution," [Ref. 16; 8] so too must the implications of different levels of military action be examined to decide best how to

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<sup>4</sup> Donald Nuechterlein's "National Interest Matrix," separating the intensity of national interests into four categories: *survival*, *vital*, *major*, and *peripheral*, will be discussed further in Chapter IV.

enforce United Nations resolutions. This chapter lists six levels of U.N. military operations, ranging in intensity from humanitarian aid to enforcement of United Nations Security Council resolutions and punishment. Traditionally, the United States military has only participated in collective military operations at either end of the spectrum. Secondary military powers, the so-called *peacekeepers*, have participated in the middle operations. While the end of the Cold War suggests a broadening of the middle types of operations, in general the extreme forms of military operations--humanitarian aid, enforcement and punishment--by their very nature will not likely change. Rather, the occurrences of these operations may potentially increase.

In their excellent text on United Nations peacekeeping, Thomas G. Weiss and Jarat Chopra use five categories to describe the range of United Nations military operations. The categories include "both traditional and potential operations, and progress from simpler observation tasks to more complex objectives of law and order, as well as various uses of force." [Ref. 17; 8] Based on the operational objectives to be met, their categories are as follows:

1. Observation
2. Separation of Forces
3. Law and Order

4. Use of Limited Force
5. Enforcement

In general, one may characterize these categories by noting that *observation* missions require virtually no force, level 2 *separation of forces* and level 3 *law and order* need minimal force, level 4 *use of limited force* provides for just that, and level 5 *enforcement*, at least in the Gulf War, allows for "all means necessary." Weiss and Chopra point out *observation* "covers the most diverse and least controversial range on the escalating spectrum of peacekeeping activities." [Ref. 17; 8] Therefore, as stated in the introduction, observation missions will not be directly addressed.<sup>5</sup> Instead, an additional category of operation discussed will be level 1 *humanitarian aid*. Likewise, with a Security Council seemingly more willing to initiate actions in response to a wider variety of conflicts, it seems useful to add a category beyond enforcement: level 6 *punishment for violations of agreements/resolutions*. The following, then, is a breakdown of potential operations in which military forces either under the command or the explicit consent of the United Nations Security Council may participate.

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<sup>5</sup> However, Chapter V will examine the role of information sharing in the collective security environment, some of which is applicable for observation missions.

## A. A PARADIGM OF UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OPERATIONS

### 1. Humanitarian Aid

There is an increasing demand for international intervention in humanitarian emergencies and human rights violations. Just over a year ago, then-Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar stated, "We are clearly witnessing what is probably an irresistible shift in public attitudes toward the belief that the defense of the oppressed in the name of morality should prevail over frontiers and legal documents." [Ref. 18; 455] Likewise, Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski recently wrote that international politics "are being transformed into a more organic process of global politics. That process tends to blur the distinction between domestic and foreign priorities." [Ref. 19; 6] Therefore, the most influential resolution passed by the United Nations Security Council during the Gulf War may be Resolution 688 (1991), adopted on 5 April 1991, which "represented a significant development in the debate about international intervention in domestic disputes, in this case Iraq's repression of its Kurdish minority." [Ref. 18; 451] The resolution stated the following:

[The U.N. Security Council] demands that Iraq, as a contribution to removing the threat to international peace and security in the region, immediately end this repression and expresses the hope in the same context that an open dialogue will take place to ensure that the



human and political rights of all Iraqi citizens are respected;

[The U.N. Security Council] Insists that Iraq allow immediate access by international humanitarian organizations to all those in need of assistance in all parts of Iraq and to make available all necessary facilities for their operations(.) [Ref. 20; 2]

In their recent study of military humanitarianism, Thomas Weiss and Kurt Campbell point out that " . . . previous General Assembly resolutions (were) moral and political declarations, or 'soft' law, but Resolution 688 was 'harder,' an operational decision by the Security Council to authorize humanitarian intervention." [Ref. 18; 455] While a shift in attitudes may be occurring, as previously mentioned this study presumes the Charter will undergo no significant change in the near future that would reduce the implications of intervening "in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state." Therefore, precedents hold guidelines for future contingencies.

In general, humanitarian assistance may be divided into two categories: unilateral relief (Panama or Sri Lanka) or genuinely international relief (Sudan or Ethiopia). [Ref. 18; 451] More important to this study are the following three subcategories:

1. where a host nation extends an invitation for assistance (Bangladesh)

2. where assistance is given against the wishes of host (Iraq)

3. where civil authority has evaporated (Liberia or Yugoslavia)

Subcategory one, in which a needy country calls for outside assistance in response to a natural or man-made disaster, is self-explanatory, and detailed examination within this study is not necessary. Obviously, the political controversies and moral dilemmas inherent in intervening in a nation's domestic affairs are irrelevant if the host nation invites such intervention. Subcategories two and three, in which the host country either does not have the desire or the cohesion to request humanitarian assistance, are much more complicated. Human rights violations by a government against its people are something an outside organization virtually cannot halt without intervening "in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state."<sup>6</sup>

On one hand, the continuing effort to ease the situation for the Kurds in northern Iraq could hail the

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<sup>6</sup> For the purposes of this study, the definition of a human rights violation will follow Vernon Walters' 1989 statement at the United Nations, in which he explained the basic position of the United States by saying, "Human rights and fundamental freedoms limit the power and authority of the state, in relation to the individual. When a state transgresses those limits, it is the right and duty of the world to call attention to such abuses." [ref. K; 177]



beginning of a new, more aggressive interventionist attitude regarding humanitarianism within the United Nations Security Council. However, even among those who propose an enhanced role for the United Nations, recent events in Yugoslavia also reveal significant limitations in providing international humanitarian aid. That Yugoslavia was not brought to task by the Security Council, though fighting between the Croats and the Serbs had been taking place for months, is an indication of the sensitivity about areas of jurisdiction. [Ref. 21; 39] Likewise, to win the support of the non-aligned countries in the Security Council, "the Western sponsors of the resolution (banning arms sales to Yugoslavia) amended it to reflect the idea that the U.N. was dealing with an international crisis and not interfering in a domestic dispute." [Ref. 21; 39] Recently, the Commander-in-Chief of the United States European Forces (CINCEUCOM) offered intelligence collection assets to the United Nations Secretary-General for tracking the conflict in Yugoslavia. However, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, worried about the reaction to uninvited U-2 overflights of the area, declined the intelligence support; he did not specifically address the use of other intelligence assets such as satellites or shipboard collection capabilities. [Ref. 22]

The U.S. Navy and other western forces have maintained a presence in the Adriatic to enforce economic

sanctions against Yugoslavia (arguably causing increased hardships for the populace), which may be at cross purposes with the United Nations's avowed goal of providing humanitarian assistance to civilians caught in the crossfire. However, it is plain that nothing short of a prohibitively large force could impose peace in Yugoslavia unless there is a change of heart among the belligerents. Level 5 *enforcement* and level 6 *punishment for violations of agreements/resolutions*, which are described later, seem to require a massive operation to succeed. In the past the Security Council has judged the stakes to be so high only twice: in Korea in 1950 and the Gulf in 1990.

However, such a force also may be needed in Cambodia, with lesser United Nations forces required in several other areas too, so the chances of mustering a successful peacemaking army for Yugoslavia are slight. Since the collapse of Yugoslavian unity, and the first arrival of United Nations Peacekeeping forces in March 1992, "umpteen ceasefires have been made and broken, most of them faster than New Year's resolutions." [Ref. 23; 12] Debates in recent months have centered on the possibility of U.S. military aircraft escorting cargo aircraft carrying humanitarian relief into the warring country, or possibly landing troops in order to aid the civilian population. However, as President Bush pointed out during an 8 August

1992 press conference, "There isn't an easy formula; if there was, we would have put it into effect before now." Perhaps unsaid, but implied, is that a willingness of a host nation or at least the major non-governmental organizations within a host nation to accept U.S. military assistance appears to be a mandatory prerequisite for using "all means necessary"--including deploying U.S. ground forces--to deliver humanitarian aid.

Therefore, the situation in Iraq, in which United States military forces under the sponsorship of the United Nations provide aid to the Kurds with the acquiescence of the Iraqi government, seems an aberration resulting from the devastation of the Iraqi military during the Gulf War. Only when humanitarian operations fall into subcategory one, where a host nation extends an invitation for assistance, does it seem prudent for the U.S. to participate.

## **2. Separation of Forces**

Weiss and Chopra define *separation of forces* as "the traditional interposition force that referees a no-man's-land between two states engaged in territorial conflict." [Ref. 17; 19] This mission is conducted by peacekeeping forces, but is farther along the spectrum of military operations than strictly providing humanitarian assistance or military observers. The traditional peacekeeping role tends to occur at the end of a conflict; a theoretical

future role, which would be to prevent a conflict from erupting, will be addressed in the next section.

Although notoriously difficult to define, the role of United Nations peacekeeping operations has been "the prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities between or within states, through the medium of a peaceful third party intervention organized and directed internationally, using multinational forces of soldiers, police and civilians to restore and maintain peace."<sup>7</sup> [Ref. 16; 11] Of the more than seventeen peacekeeping or observation operations listed in Figure 2.1 that have taken place since the United Nations's efforts began in 1948 with the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), over thirty countries from Austria to Yugoslavia have provided military units. [Ref. 7] While U.S. observers have occasionally participated, only during the Korean Conflict and the recent Gulf War (neither of which is considered a traditional peacekeeping operation) have U.S. troops participated. Other permanent members of the United Nations

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<sup>7</sup> This definition, used by the International Peace Academy in its study of international control of violence: "Report from Vienna: An Appraisal of the International Peace Academy Committee's 1970 Pilot Papers," is quoted from The Thin Blue Line: International Peacekeeping and its Future by Indarjit Rikhye, Michael Harbottle, and Bjorn Egge (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 1974).



## Nations Participating in Peacekeeping Operations

**UNEF I 1956-67** This first *peacekeeping* operation, in response to the collapse of the armistice agreement between Egypt and Israel, included the following ten nations: Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, India, Indonesia, Norway, Sweden and Yugoslavia.

**ONUC 1960-64** This large operation, which at its height was comprised of nearly 20,000 officers and men in the Congo, included forces from the following nations: Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Morocco, Tunisia and Sweden.

**UNTEA/UNSF 1962-63** The forces sent to maintain law and order after the ceasefire between the Dutch and the Indonesians in West New Guinea were Brazil, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), India, Ireland, Nigeria, Sweden, Pakistan and Canada.

**UNFICYP 1964-** To quell the intercommunal strife between Turkish and Greek Cypriots, Canadian, British, Swedish, Irish, Finnish, Danish, Austrian and Kiwi forces were sent.

**UNEF II 1973-79** The 7,000 strong peacekeeping force, deployed after the Yom Kippur War, had troops from twelve countries: Canada, Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, Ghana, Indonesia, Nepal, Panama, Peru, Poland and Senegal.

**UNIFIL 1978-** The chaotic situation in southern Lebanon led to the establishment of this 6,000 member force that included Iran, Canada, Sweden, France, Nepal, Norway, Nigeria, Senegal, Fiji and Ireland.

**Yugoslavia 1992-** Current plans include the deployment of 12 infantry battalions (about a 14,400-member force) in three areas of Croatia. Contributing countries include Russia, France, Belgium, Canada, Finland, Holland, Ireland and Jordan. [Ref. 24; A13]

Additionally, U.N. observer missions have been sent to the Palestinian/Lebanese area (UNTSO 1948- , UNOGIL 1958 and UNDOF 1974- ), Indian/Pakistani border (UNMOGIP 1949- and UNIPOM 1965-66), Yemen (UNYOM 1963-64), the Dominican Republic (DOMREP 1965-66), Afghanistan (1988-90), the Iran/Iraq border (1988- ), Angola (1989- ), Namibia (1989-90), and Central America (1989- ). Several of these missions contain(ed) military forces which technically make them peacekeeping operations.

Figure 2.1

Security Council have only rarely participated. Britain and France have committed forces largely because they already were involved in independent efforts in an area; Russia's first peacekeeping effort is Yugoslavia.

At first glance it seems surprising that countries with the military assets and wide-ranging interests most able to provide the aforementioned "prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities" have been least likely to participate in an impartial collective security action. This fact is highlighted in A. LeRoy Bennett's International Organizations, which discusses the group of countries, including "the Nordic states, Canada, and India, (who) have been enthusiastic supporters of the peacekeeping philosophy, have furnished men and material for peacekeeping missions, and have provided leadership in short- and long-range planning for more effective United Nations peacekeeping activities." [Ref. 25; 144] Bennett stresses that these countries are "in a unique position to contribute personnel because of their reputation for neutrality." [Ref. 25; 144] Likewise, these countries have sufficient economic and military resources, as well as a close affinity between their national interests and the United Nations's goals and principles. Conspicuously absent from his "top ten" list



are any of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.<sup>8</sup>

Ironically, it seems as though the United States, the country with the most resources to offer international peacekeeping, has historically provided the least. For example, when the United Nations Peacekeeping forces won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1988, the "blue helmets" were recognized publicly for their success, if not in closing social or political fissures, then at least separating forces in Afghanistan, Angola, Namibia and Central America. While the United Nations was breaking exciting new ground in collective security, the United States Congress and President were debating whether even to pay previously agreed upon levels of financial support to the United Nations. A U.S. view of the United Nations and its agencies as "inefficient, bloated bureaucracies often hostile to American interests" [Ref. 8; E3] led to the withholding of \$675 million due the organization during the 1980s and early 1990s.

This situation is especially perplexing, considering the cost of the alternative to peacekeeping. For example,

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<sup>8</sup> Bennett's ten most frequent participants in peacekeeping missions are Canada (16 times including Bosnia), Finland (14), Sweden (13), Ireland (13), Denmark (11), Norway (10), Italy (9), Australia (8), Austria (8), and India (8).

although peacekeeping is expensive,<sup>9</sup> to put it in perspective, "the annual cost of the observer group which monitors the cease-fire between Iran and Iraq is less than the value of the crude oil carried in only two supertankers." [Ref. 7; xvii] Another writer pointed out that "one and a half days of the cost of Desert Storm, the operation which finally liberated Kuwait, would have paid for all the U.N. peacekeeping operations world-wide for one year." [Ref. 26; 317] Stability can be either good or bad depending on the merits of the system in question, including a variety of effects such as "unbridled arms races; the rise of regional hegemons or other large imbalances of regional or subregional balance of power; wholesale human rights violations; flagrant breach of international law; subversion of democratic and free-market institutions; and threats to the sea-air-land-space lines of communication." [Ref. 27; 14] But it seems clear that keeping the peace is valuable for a variety of reasons.

Weiss and Chopra state that there are at least five traditional problems for peacekeeping forces. Importantly, the last four of these five problems transcend "mere" peacekeeping operations, and may be applied to any

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<sup>9</sup> In 1989 the peacekeeping budget was almost as great as the United Nations's regular budget.

multinational operation.<sup>10</sup> The first, *consent of the parties*, applies to those least violent operations in which little military force by the intervening agency is expected to be required. In the context of this study, *consent of the parties* is required for humanitarian operations and separation of forces.

Peacekeeping necessitates a defensive nature, so an international force traditionally has not had the

tools to impose its will on a nation's regular army, an armed insurgent group, or rampant faction. Without 'political will'--that is, the desire and intention of parties to cease fighting and to end their conflict--peacekeepers are ineffective. [Ref. 17; 31]

Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar pointed out in 1990, a peacekeeping operation is an "interim arrangement; it should, ultimately, contribute to a just and lasting solution to the conflict concerned." [Ref. 7; xvii] This "just and lasting solution," however, is only possible when disputing factions are ready to accept a solution short of complete victory.

The second requirement is garnering *political support from the Security Council and member states*. Political consensus, discussed further in Chapter III, is

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<sup>10</sup> Weiss and Chopra's fifth peacekeeping concern is *funding and logistical support from the Security Council and member states*, which will not be discussed in this study.

often difficult to achieve, and may directly affect the creation of a peacekeeping force's operational mandate. Potentially more tricky is maintaining political support during difficult or controversial operations.

The third difficulty is creating the *operational mandate*. Weiss and Chopra point out that the creation of these often require compromises, so ambiguity in the mandate has often been necessary to achieve consensus. An enlightening case to consider is the use of the U.S. military and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in 1982-1984. The 6,000 soldiers from Finland, Fiji, France, Ghana, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Senegal and Sweden "existed to prevent the constant Israeli/PLO strife" [Ref. 28; 194] along the Israeli/Lebanese border. However, the largely ineffectual effort nearly resulted in Yassir Arafat's and the Palestinian Liberation Organization's (PLO) extinction, which led to the U.S.'s being asked to help arrange a PLO withdrawal from the region during the summer of 1982: a clear mission for the U.S., and one which it successfully conducted. But, afterwards, as time went on and U.S. forces were reinserted into Lebanon in September 1982, their mission "was not as clear or finite." [Ref. 28; 196] Perhaps the lesson most well learned from the U.S.'s participation in the Multinational Force (MNF) in Lebanon,

which resulted in the tragic deaths of more than 218 marines, 18 sailors and three soldiers [Ref. 28; 228] at the hands of an Islamic Hezbollah Amal terrorist in October 1983, is that an unclear mandate is not only a factor for the multinational forces, it also directly affects the perceptions of host countries.

A fourth difficulty the *use of force*. Perhaps the greatest change between traditional United Nations military operations and those of the future will be regarding the use of force by peacekeepers. Weiss and Chopra state that "even if peacekeepers use force of some kind, it does not follow that they have no limitations on their authorization to employ it." [Ref. 17; 42] It seems logical that a more intrusive mandate will require less constrained forces. Mackinlay, in his "Powerful Peacekeepers," proposes that combat soldiers from larger and better equipped militaries such as those of the permanent members of the Security Council contribute to the more intrusive operations. [Ref. 29; 248] An additional constraint on force is proportionality of action. [Ref. 17; 41] Therefore, the interpretation of "all necessary means" to allow large-scale strategic bombing of Iraq during the Gulf War seems an anomaly due to the nature of Iraq's aggression and the peculiarities of the world's then-current geopolitical circumstances.



In the post-Vietnam United States, as its military force's options become more severely constrained, a deployment probably will be less apt to achieve and maintain the domestic consensus required for the military to participate successfully. As Colin Powell recently wrote, "one of the essential elements of our national military strategy is the ability to rapidly assemble the forces needed to win--the concept of applying decisive force to overwhelm our adversaries and thereby terminate conflicts swiftly with a minimum loss of life." [Ref. 15; 10] Therefore, if the United States participates but is not at the vanguard of a collective security operation, it seems imperative that a clear mandate allowing sufficient force is required; if the United States is in control of the operation, a more ambiguous mandate from the Security Council may allow the military force sufficient leeway to pursue aggressive military objectives. However, decision-makers must take into account global perceptions of undue military force which could quickly erode international support for a collective security operation.

### **3. Law and Order**

The idea of *preventing* an outbreak of violence rather than reacting to an outbreak seems closer to the spirit of the Charter than the use of peacekeeping forces. Weiss and Chopra point out that "very few operations have

been authorized to maintain law and order, which could well be considered the turning point between Chapters VI and VII in the spectrum of international military operations." [Ref. 17; 20] Force is used in more than a strictly defensive capacity (although only on exceptional occasions), and the forces mandated are allowed more intrusive powers than those allotted peacekeepers. With less constraints on military power, the likelihood of United States participation increases accordingly.

In his Soldiers Without Enemies: Preparing the United Nations for Peacekeeping, Larry Fabian notes that the differences between preparedness for collective security and preparedness for peacekeeping are conspicuous:

Collective security armies, for instance, were to be largely Big Five armies, a proviso not written explicitly into the Charter, but imprinted there--in one writer's metaphor--in invisible ink. These permanent members of the Security Council were to be the mainstays of U.N. striking forces because they were thought to possess the political and military weight to enforce the United Nations' collective will rather than because they displayed political impartiality and lack of interest in outcomes of local quarrels. But the latter are often the crucial badges of a peacekeeper. [Ref. 30; 5-6]

Impartiality and lack of interest are the grounds on which the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council traditionally have been excluded from participating in most United Nations military operations. Global superpowers necessarily have global interests, and the geopolitical

circumstances in which the United States, as an island nation not fully self-sufficient in resources, has found itself means impartiality was often difficult or impossible to achieve. While "it can be argued that only major powers wield the real instruments of preventive diplomacy, such as control of the flow of arms or of international trade," [Ref. 4; 23] more accurately the very reasons that the United States uses to justify its leading role in international organizations such as the United Nations--trade relations and commerce, security concerns, and political interests--have virtually prohibited the possibility of the United States's maintaining impartiality in regional crises. The United States, with its global economy, logically has its "finger in the pie" of a good many smaller nations, suggesting it may not be the most impartial of peacekeepers or peacemakers, especially when its legitimate interests are at stake. [Ref. 30; 24] In other words, the U.S. has virtually never been an objective observer of regional disputes. Is this situation changing? The most correct answer is both yes and no.

The end of the Cold War has signalled a new era in relations between the United States and what once was the Soviet Union: an era in which objections to activity by permanent members of the Security Council apparently will less likely conflict with the interests of the other

permanent Council members. This relative unanimity logically may lead to additional Security Council activity. However, this increased activity could conflict with the interests of Third World nations. If the vital interests of developing nations are most often considered in terms of international prestige and national sovereignty, then intrusive activity by the Security Council may directly affect the vital interests of developing nations.

The composition of the United Nations has changed over the years, and now developing nations hold a majority of the General Assembly seats. Therefore, it appears that smaller nations' perceptions of the permanent Security Council members' partisan intervention in regional crises may become even more sensitive, even if "the Cold War's demise has diminished what little sense of political unity remains among the members of the so-called nonaligned movement, encouraging developing countries to go their own ways." [Ref. 31; A13] As a result, it seems logical that the developing world may become a jealous (and zealous) watchdog as its influence at the United Nations diminishes while real power passes to the United States, the Russian Federation and the other permanent members of the revived Security Council.

Weiss and Chopra point out that even if the sensitivities of Third World nations to intervention could



be assuaged, "the practical problem remains regarding the extent, size, and capacities of a U.N. law-and-order operation." [Ref. 17; 21] Past precedents such as the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) in 1960 suggest large-scale law-and-order operations are virtually impossible to perform during a civil war. However, the need to replace multinational forces in the camps created for the Kurds in Iraq suggest something must be done. Similar situations are bound to arise in the future. While credible firepower is needed, still it seems the traditional reasons for keeping United States military forces from participating in peacekeeping operations (potentially undue limitations on force, and Third World concerns of neo-colonialism and lack impartiality) remain valid regarding future law-and-order operations.

#### **4. Use of Limited Force**

Weiss and Chopra describe the *use of limited force* as "the missing link" [Ref. 17; 22] between traditional defensive peacekeeping roles and the aggressive actions of enforcement operations. Logically, if United Nations military operations become increasingly involved in civil wars, "enhanced peacekeepers with 'teeth' will be required to protect local populations and prevent widely accepted peace processes from being unlawfully violated." [Ref. 17; 23] Past debacles such as the MNF in Beirut and the IPKF in



Sri Lanka highlight the difficulties in sending forces with limited capabilities into areas in which warring parties are likely to have more knowledge of the area and a stronger "political will."

It is a fundamental tenet of realism that security concerns will override other factors in determining a country's policies. This point suggests that as international security concerns become less political, regional instabilities will likely require more intrusive forms of intervention. "Soon it will no longer be acceptable," wrote Bernard Kouchner in *Le Monde*, "to cross a border to wage war but not to do the same to make peace and save lives."<sup>11</sup> With the reduction in fears concerning global escalation of regional disputes, there will be an increasing demand for international intervention in local emergencies of virtually every type. However, if

the international system is to play a helpful role in the disorders of the future, its members will not simply have to improve its performance and its capacity to intervene constructively. Governments also will have to consider how, and how far, to modify the existing rules of the game, especially as regards national sovereignty and the sacrosanct nature of domestic jurisdiction.

[Ref. 4; 20]

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<sup>11</sup> Quoted by Thomas G. Weiss and Kurt M. Campbell in "Military Humanitarianism," Survival, (September/October 1991): 451-465.

But, as mentioned earlier, this study presumes that there will be no significant changes to the *Charter of the United Nations* in the near future that will allow for easier intrusion into a sovereign nation's domestic disputes. Therefore, the controversies surrounding international intervention in chronic disputes is likely to grow as the potential intensity of that intervention grows too.

Regarding the United States military, significantly limiting its power to perform a security operation seems counter to any reason for sending it. Weiss and Chopra describe *limited force* operations as a bridge between peacekeeping and enforcement operations. While theoretically possible, history suggests these operations are impractical for the United Nations, especially if the military command structure of the United Nations (or lack of one) does not change.

## **5. Enforcement**

If peacekeeping forces have been best created from middle or secondary powers, then enforcement of United Nations resolutions that extend beyond mere peacekeeping activities must be the realm of the Big Five. "At the higher levels of the conflict spectrum big power interests are more deeply involved, and any attempt at physical interventions by middle and small nation-states to influence

a peaceful settlement are neither realistic nor viable."

[Ref. 16; 8] Like a rubber band stretching to contain a bundle of papers, as more United Nations countries become involved in resolution enforcement, the likelihood of consensus failure increases accordingly.<sup>12</sup> In the words of Weiss and Chopra, "the feasibility of ideal forms of collective security remains in question." [Ref. 17; 24]

Enforcement of Security Council resolutions may take many forms, including political, economic, or diplomatic pressure. But, while "military intervention in internal conflicts is only the tip of the iceberg," [Ref. 11; 117] and the military as an instrument of policy is almost never used in isolation, ultimately, military force remains the final arbiter of international disputes.

Only three times has the United Nations called for enforcement operations: most notably in Korea in 1950 and the Gulf in 1990, but also in Rhodesia (1966-75). Interestingly, in each of these operations, one of the permanent members of the Security Council took the lead in garnering Security Council support for resolutions allowing for the use of force. In the first two instances the United States and in the third, the United Kingdom, was at the

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<sup>12</sup> The importance of achieving a consensus before and during an operation will be discussed in Chapter III of this study.

vanguard. (The British role played in Rhodesia, while technically an *enforcement/punishment* role, was more accurately a naval peacekeeping mission.) Interestingly, in Rhodesia and the Gulf the vanguard nation virtually "sub-contracted" the operation from the United Nations; only in Korea was the enforcement operation conducted under a United Nations flag.

The political cohesion required to secure consistent political or economic pressure on belligerents is exceedingly difficult, and appears only practical when one nation takes the vanguard of the operations. The relative ease with which the United Nations Security Council achieved consensus during the Gulf War was a rarity, resulting from U.S. efforts. The relatively limitless means allotted the multinational force seems more of an anomalous than a representative model of future crisis response. However, enforcement operations--one of the extreme forms of collective operation--will likely remain a relatively rare or anomalous activity.

## **6. Punishment for Violations of Agreements/Resolutions**

A primary lesson learned during the Gulf War was that *enforcement* operations, given the proper mandate, are able to succeed. In the aftermath of the war, it seems the next logical step for collective security forces is the implementation of *punishment* measures resulting from



violations of Security Council agreements or resolutions. By *punishment*, this study means operations that stretch beyond implementation of punitive economic or political sanctions, operations that include what could be, in essence, a retaliatory strike for failure to comply with Security Council measures.

In one writer's words,

To read the Charter is to glimpse the kind of future the drafters of that document were making provision for, even though many were not optimistic about its likelihood. Great powers, their wartime unity sufficiently preserved, were to be the foundation of a new collective security system. They jointly were to guide it from the Security Council; they were to guarantee it with armed forces, principally their own, placed at the Council's disposal; they were to guard their own interests from unwanted U.N. action by their veto power, without which none of the Big Five would have joined the U.N. Potential aggressors were to be deterred or, if this failed, were to be punished by the combined military might of the international community. [Ref. 30; 1]

However, one of the presumptions of this study is that neither the MSC nor standing military forces, two organizations originally envisioned in the Charter, will be revitalized. Therefore, the fundamental difficulty of conducting a retaliatory operation in a collective security context is that it requires a degree of cohesion not built into the institutions of the United Nations themselves. The difficulties of achieving consensus for a *punishment* operation was highlighted in 1986, when the United States,



conducting the retaliatory strikes against Libya, was not granted overflight rights by its "ally" France. Likewise, the vagarities of the "all necessary means" language during the events leading up to the Gulf War suggest the clarity of a potential military operation's mandate is inversely proportional to the controversy surrounding it.

Taking the long view, someday Security Council resolutions may include clearcut, automatic *punishment* measures if compliance does not occur. "That is to say, a seriously negative evaluation of a situation should trigger off appropriate . . . action within or outside the Security Council." [Ref. 4; 23] However, United Nations military operations traditionally have "taken different forms to meet a number of different crises," [Ref. 17; 4] because of the *ad hoc* nature of the operations and the lack of cohesion at the Security Council. During the Gulf War and, earlier, the Korean Conflict, this lack of cohesion was mitigated by two coincidental occurrences: the leadership role accepted by the United States and the virtual non-existence of activity from the Soviet Union. Currently, an increased coordination and notification between United States and former Soviet military forces bodes well for a cooperative environment in future military operations. But, ultimately, without a coherent command structure, United Nations military operations may only be possible with a United States willing

to take the burden of responsibility for the effort. This may occur in instances in which the repercussions of a nation's failure to comply with United Nations's measures are clearly spelled out in a Security Council resolution. On the other hand, as Security Council guidelines for a military operation become more clearly defined, it seems inevitable that military power will become more limited. As will be shown in the next chapter, when consensus exists in the United States for a military operation using "all necessary means," but does not exist internationally, a unilateral operation is the better option.

## **B. CONCLUSIONS**

As discussed earlier, it is the middle or secondary world powers who appear best able to participate in United Nations peacekeeping operations, because it is they who are most likely to invoke trust in the disputing parties. At the "frontier of peacekeeping," [Ref. 17; 23] *law and order* operations likely will be less constrained than the more traditional *separation of forces*. However, *law and order* remains closely related to traditional peacekeeping operations, and those countries with the military culture and global reputation for peacekeeping remain most suited for the role. Regarding the use of *limited force*, the permanent members of the Security Council have the resources

to participate. However, the United States would likely have significant problems achieving the domestic consensus required to participate--especially if the operation did not relate to the country's vital interests.

For military actions outside the parameters of peacekeeping, actions such as *enforcement* and *punishment*, a superpower seems required. The precedent of the Gulf War suggests the United States may have earned the reputation of an enforcer without a neo-colonialist agenda. In President Bush's words, "America's role is rooted not only in power, but also in trust." [Ref. 1; 8] Likewise, "America cannot be responsible for solving all the world's security problems. But she remains the country to whom others turn when in distress." [Ref. 27; 16] Punishment operations, while theoretically possible in a collective context, seem more apt to occur as unilateral operations.

The difficulty, then, for United States decision-makers is determining under what circumstances the nation's military should get involved in large-scale United Nations operations. With a sufficient mandate from the United Nations to use its "superpower," the United States is well equipped to act in a collective role. Without, a unilateral operation appears to be the best option. The next chapter of this study hopes to provide a paradigm for just such decisions.

### III. MODEL FOR U.S. DECISION-MAKING

Increasingly we may find ourselves in situations in which our interests are congruent with those of nations not tied to us by formal treaties. As in the Gulf, we may be acting in hybrid coalitions that include not only traditional allies but also nations with whom we do not have a mature history of diplomatic and military cooperation or, indeed, even a common political or moral outlook. This will require flexibility in our diplomacy and military policy, without losing sight of the fundamental values which that diplomacy and policy are designed to protect and on which they are based. To this end, we are well served to strengthen the role of international organizations like the United Nations.

President Bush, 1991

If "U.S. activism in concert with other industrial democracies most completely takes into account the relationship between ends and limited means, takes advantage of allies' contributions, focuses on what the U.S. does well, and plays to U.S. strengths," [Ref. 27; 9] then it is extremely important to determine the factors involved in a decision to conduct a collective security operation. Typically, policy follows public opinion. But, whereas previous studies have examined the important "task of garnering and maintaining public support for intervention policy," [Ref. 32; 1] and many others have detailed the means for best conducting various types of warfare, this portion of the study will describe the two-stage model presented in Figure 3.1 (located toward the end of the

chapter), encompassing both the support and the means for collective security decision-making.

The first stage examines three important *domestic* factors that currently affect U.S. decision-making: goal definition, domestic elite consensus, and domestic popular support. These factors will be described and examined in detail. Obviously, not all potential U.S. military operations are appropriate for participation by collective security organizations. The Panama and Grenada operations, to name two, while garnering enough public support domestically<sup>13</sup> for unilateral action by the U.S. military, likely would never have received the global support required for action by an international organization. If a domestic consensus exists, military operations may occur. For collective military operations, an international consensus is needed.

The second stage of this collective security decision-making model highlights two *international* factors that affect U.S. decision-making: international elite support and global popular support. If these factors, along with the previously mentioned *domestic* factors, are achieved,

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<sup>13</sup> It has been compellingly argued that support for the Grenada operation came after the fact, largely due to the success of the operation. In any case, Grenada and Panama eventually received solid domestic support; international support was on much shakier ground.



then it appears appropriate for the U.S. military to participate in a collective security operation.

It is also important to consider the differences between regional and international security organizations. One can imagine a scenario in which a collective security organization such as the Organization of American States or NATO would be able to achieve the aforementioned decisive factors, but an international organization such as the United Nations could not. A situation wherein a regional organization, but not an international organization, would be willing to accept the risks involved in an operation that has extremely significant local, but not global implications, comes to mind. If this scenario occurs, then a regional organization is probably the appropriate means with which to conduct a military operation. The decision-making model includes this possibility in its "partial" international elite consensus and international popular dissension. After all, for a government or military (or even a public) besieged by simultaneous emergencies and often limited by budget, manpower or other concerns, not every regional crisis is equally important.

Similarly, it is important to consider several moral issues when examining the use of collective security forces. In a perfect world, in which the U.S. or other industrialized democracies had unlimited assets, virtually

every legitimate request for humanitarian assistance would be met. However, while moral considerations may be important or even decisive in garnering public support for military operations, with little effort, one also may imagine a scenario in which humanitarian assistance is called for, and yet the U.S. government may not be able to respond because military and civilian assets are already dedicated to another, more pressing need. Returning to the six levels of operations discussed in the first portion of this chapter, this study presumes that as events escalate the ladder of military action, each higher rung takes precedence over the lower ones. For example, as events during Desert Shield and Storm unfolded (level 5 *enforcement* and level 6 *punishment for violations of agreements/resolutions*), U.S. military forces were pulled from their responsibilities in Europe (in a sense operating as Cold War peacekeepers, which equates to level 2 *separation of forces*) and elsewhere to fulfill the more pressing obligation in the Middle East.

#### **A. DOMESTIC FACTORS**

Domestic factors must first be considered because without the support of the U.S. populace and the National Command Authority, clearly a military operation will not be initiated. In order to streamline this study's decision-

making model, it will be presumed that factors such as funding, manpower and policy can be grouped within the category of National Command Authority (NCA) consensus. Whereas military staffs must continuously plan and consider a wide range of contingencies, in the language of this study the vast majority of these actions never occur because the elite consensus required for the operation to take place has not been reached. Only after a domestic debate has occurred and a consensus achieved can the U.S. look to collective security organizations for potential participation in an operation. While the relationship between elite consensus and popular consensus is a little like that between the chicken and the egg, nevertheless there are several important factors in deciding whether domestic consensus before military action is possible.

### **1. Domestic Elite Consensus**

If elite organizations or persons are defined as those "who are able, by virtue of their strategic position . . . to affect national political outcomes regularly and substantially," [Ref. 33; 8] then the elite within the United States government is the NCA and Congress. The Constitution gives the President the power to employ military forces, while the congressional role is to provide the forces and the laws under which they operate. The war power is a shared power with Congress; the Constitution

intends it to be shared. As with any shared power, power is strongest when the NCA and Congress agree. However, Congress often is not equipped to deal with a complex, risky military debate in a short time.<sup>14</sup> Therefore, presidents often act unilaterally to employ military forces.

While Congress has the power to declare war, historically it has voted usually after war has started. For example, there have been more than 200 occasions when presidents have used military force, but only five declarations of war. [Ref. 34; 357] However, even with constitutional authority, the President's political authority is vastly enhanced by congressional backing. To consider consensus practically (if somewhat cynically), if a military operation has a successful result, a congressional consensus is not especially necessary. Likewise, if a military operation fails or its costs are extraordinarily high, it also does not matter if Congress has approved the operation in advance, because it will likely second-guess the NCA anyway. In other words, while congressional

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<sup>14</sup> For example, in August 1941, just four months before Pearl Harbor, the House of Representatives was able to muster only a one-vote margin for continuing the Selective Service system. Nearly fifty years later, on 12 January 1991, the congressional resolution granting the "use of military force" in Desert Storm passed in the House by a vote of 250 to 183, and barely passed in the Senate by a vote of 52 to 47. [ref. 34; 362]

goodwill is a worthy goal, there is relatively little gain and lots of risk in wooing Congress.

Ultimately, the question becomes, what role does Congress play in the debate on the use of military forces? For the purposes of this study, Congress's most important role is in providing a forum for conducting the public debate necessary to determining whether there is a domestic popular consensus.

## **2. Domestic Popular Consensus**

If "democracies are unique in their reliance upon public support for sustained intervention," [Ref. 32; 19] then public opinion is the groundswell upon which the NCA may propel its defense policies. In his excellent Naval Postgraduate School thesis entitled *A Democratic Call to Arms: Public Opinion and Intervention Policy*, Carl Graham notes three "sliding" factors that tend to mirror public opinion: fear of escalation, global/regional reaction and liberal values. Briefly, *fear of escalation* addresses the "psychological effects of potential vertical, horizontal, or temporal escalation"; [Ref. 32; 20] *Global/regional reaction* considers that "the American public knows that global and regional support (or at least apathy) are desirable prerequisites to successful intervention"; [Ref. 32; 22] finally, *liberal values* are another name for "the American value system itself." [Ref. 32; 25] In other



words, "American values dictate that the costs of intervention must be justified by legitimate objectives . . . in the beliefs and vocabulary of the liberal ethic." [Ref. 32; 28] While these factors do indeed play a role in determining public support for a military operation, since the end of the Cold War these factors have significantly changed in importance.

Fear of escalation was, in a sense, what made the Cold War so frigid. Now, with the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists's* setting back its Doomsday Clock<sup>15</sup> and the 1992 Olympic Games's being the first in two decades not boycotted by at least one nation, this study submits that fear of escalation is virtually a non-factor in public opinion. In contrast, global/regional reactions, or at least public perceptions of international opinion, probably have increased in importance. In an earlier section of this study, the changing nature of the U.S. security threat was mentioned, with environmental and health concerns pointing to a future wherein the sovereignty of nations may take a back seat to the advancement of liberal and humanitarian values. Therefore, while humanitarian concerns have moved

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<sup>15</sup> The *Bulletin's* clock, "symbol of the threat of global catastrophe," currently stands at 17 minutes to midnight, so far back that it is in previously uncharted territory. Conceived at the dawn of the Cold War, the clock was designed with a fifteen-minute range.

even further to the forefront of U.S. public opinion, fear of escalation and global war concerns have been replaced by a new factor that may best be described as *clearcut goal definition*. If one accepts that the culture of the United States inherently stresses goal achievement, seemingly more so than many other cultures, then American values are such that the public will bestow confidence in a military action in which movement takes place and a goal is to be achieved. During the Cold War, static operations regarding the Soviets (level 2 *separation of forces*) were the price paid for achieving a global balance of power. Now, there will more likely be support for an operation that accomplishes a clearcut goal rather than a mission that *keeps someone else from accomplishing* a goal. General Schwarzkopf, in his testimony during Senator Nunn's Fall 1990 Armed Services Committee hearings on the military operation in the Gulf, reportedly said the following: "If the alternative to dying [during an offensive] is sitting out in the sun for another summer, that's not a bad alternative." [Ref. 34; 342]

However, in the context of collective security, the relatively status quo (or static) "mid-level" operations--level 2, *separation of forces*; level 3, *law and order*; and level 4, *use of limited force*--which, as this study submits, are relatively alien to the popular American perceptions of a dynamic military, are best conducted by mid-level

industrialized powers, such as those countries listed in Figure 2.1 that currently are most active in peacekeeping operations.

## **B. INTERNATIONAL FACTORS**

### **1. International Elite Support**

In the language of this study, the international elite consists of the heads of allied governments, most notably members of NATO and other countries with close political, economic or military ties to the U.S., such as Australia, Japan, and South Korea. Additionally, the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council are part of the international elite. International elite consensus occurs when there is an absence of vetoes by other members of the Big Five and tacit or public endorsement for an operation by U.S. "friends and allies." [Ref. 1; 112]

Clearly, members of the international community will support intervention when it serves their interests. When the issue at stake does not directly affect their vital or major interests, members will most likely support (or at least not denigrate) U.S. military intervention. In that event, unilateral action appears the best alternative for the U.S. military. When a potential U.S. military action appears likely to arouse allies' or Security Council's worries (which would, in fact, probably be every case), then

a clear articulation of the ideological and practical justification of the operation should ease the fears of the international elite. For the foreseeable future, this study does not consider possible that there will be a U.S. military action that directly conflicts with the majority of its allies' or members of the Security Council's best interests.

## **2. International Popular Support**

Democratic rule is an intrinsic part of the U.S. political tradition. Likewise, an intervention by the U.S. military against a majority of world opinion is contrary to this tradition. Of course, there have been and probably will be future instances in which the U.S. will intervene militarily contrary to world popular opinion: instances in which short term security concerns outweigh the traditional importance of popular opinion. As shown by the model in Figure 3.1, however, in those cases U.S. interests are best served by unilateral U.S. military action, rather than action by a collective security organization. Likewise, an action that arouses world public opinion against the U.S. will likely not achieve the elite consensus required for a collective security operation in the first place.


Determining whether international popular consensus exists remains a crude activity. There are nearly as many opinions and positions in the world as there are people.

"Too often, we have to rely on impressions and assertions, prejudices and preconceptions, newspaper cuttings and quick visits." [Ref. 35; 36] Perhaps the best way to consider whether global popular support exists for an operation is to ask the opposite question: does global popular support *not* exist? In other words, if there is a significant rise in demonstrations, unrest, terrorist activity and strident open-press rhetoric, then the hoped-for global popular support does not exist. However, if there is no clear demonstration of opposition to the operation, then the decision-maker may presume that either support for or apathy for an operation exists.

### **C. DECISION-MAKING MODEL**

Figure 3.1 presents a model for deciding whether the United States should look to collective security organizations to intervene in a given scenario. The model is divided into two phases to account for the domestic factors that decide whether the U.S. military should participate and the international factors that reveal whether the U.S. may best act unilaterally or in cooperation with other nations' military forces. The process is iterative. Once the initial criteria are met, decision-makers must continue to maintain domestic and international support. If support begins to wane, the goals of the





## DECISION-MAKING MODEL

Figure 3.1

intervention must be reconsidered, with an eye to terminating the operation or restructuring it from a collective to an independent action.

The process is fairly straightforward. Beginning with the first step of *clearcut goal definition*, decision-makers are asked to analyze whether, after there is a domestic elite consensus, there is also domestic popular support for the operation. After achieving the necessary domestic popular support, decision-makers need to consider whether the enhanced media spotlight given to collective operations will increase or decrease the chances of success for the operation. If increased publicity seems likely to increase the probability of success, then decision-makers may look to the international elite for the consensus required to initiate collective security operations. If an international elite consensus, as well as global mass support, exists then an operation under the auspices of the United Nations is appropriate. If either international elite support or global mass support does not exist, but regional elite support and regional mass support do (considered "partial" support in the model) for a given operation, then a regional collective security operation is appropriate.

#### D. IRAQ AND BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

As a means to illustrate the utility of this model, it is interesting to compare the elite and popular perceptions internationally and domestically of the situations in Iraq in 1990-1 and in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1991-2. Virtually from the moment Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990, there was an international outcry. With a clearcut aggressor and the precedent of the Carter Doctrine highlighting the vital interests of the region, a *clearcut goal definition* of defending the Saudi border was achieved by the *domestic elite*; early support by the President for a wholesale military effort not unduly limited in the use of force in defense of Saudi Arabia helped keep the NCA from significant disagreements. From the *domestic popular* viewpoint, Saddam Hussein's military aggression clearly violated American *liberal values*, and the stories of atrocities by his forces in Kuwait helped fortify popular support. Likewise, *international elite support* was confirmed officially through emergency sessions of the Security Council and unofficially through personal contacts between President Bush, senior members of his staff and other heads of state, most notably the Emir of Kuwait and King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, who ultimately decided to accept U.S. ground forces. Examining whether there was *global mass dissension*, in the form of rampant protests or increasing terrorist activity, the

answer is no, which results in the decision-making model concluding that a United Nations military operation (Desert Shield) is appropriate.

As the coalition deployment progressed, Saddam Hussein continued his military build-up and economic looting of Kuwait, helping to steel international support against him. Additionally, he committed a series of blunders including holding western hostages, threatening an escalation of the conflict and rejecting calls for negotiations with the United States during fall 1990. President Bush met with congressional leadership on 30 November 1990 [Ref. 34; 337], leading to Senator Nunn's hearings and a vote of confidence from Congress on 12 January 1991 for an offensive operation. In the language of this study's decision-making model, the vote symbolized domestic popular support for Desert Storm (at least, once virtually every diplomatic effort to end the crisis had been attempted).

As a sidenote, this transformation to the offensive is where events significantly altered from those in Korea nearly 40 years earlier. Whereas General MacArthur's United Nations force had difficulty receiving a mandate to cross the 38th parallel, what one writer described as a "curious hesitancy in many reactions" [Ref. 36; 585] to news of the plan to unify Korea, General Schwarzkopf was in a position to use "all necessary means" including specifically the "use

of military force." The difference in the two operations is largely due to the aforementioned *fear of escalation*. While the Chinese army's entering Korea completely changed the dynamic of that conflict, during the Gulf War Israel remained on the sidelines despite Saddam Hussein's extensive efforts to escalate. Likewise, the Soviet Union remained quiet, as other, more pressing domestic difficulties turned its attention inward. Finally, maintenance of support for the Gulf War was, in essence, moot because of the shortness of the campaign.

In contrast, while the situation in what was once Yugoslavia remains dynamic, for illustrative purposes this study will separate potential operations into two forms: a limited *humanitarian aid* mission and a *large-scale peacekeeping* or *law-and-order* operation. Considering *humanitarian aid*, a *clearcut goal definition* seems relatively easy to achieve. Likewise, a consensus among the *domestic elite* seems possible, especially considering the past successes and working relationship between President Bush and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Powell. *Humanitarian aid* is inherently a part of American *liberal values*, which bodes well for domestic popular support. At the *international elite* level, there has been at least partial support for humanitarian efforts; this partial support causes the decision-making model to conclude



that an effort by at least a regional organization is appropriate. However, concerning *global mass dissension*, while most of the world either supports or is indifferent to a *humanitarian aid* effort, recent attacks on peacekeepers and humanitarian workers, including the shootdown of an Italian cargo aircraft at the beginning of September, point out that support does not exist within the region itself (for more information on *humanitarian aid* issues, please refer to Chapter II). This lack of popular support within the region severely reduces the likelihood of wholesale United States military participation in a humanitarian operation. As mentioned in Chapter II, humanitarian operations inherently require a strictly defensive posture and at least the tacit consent of the conflicting parties. (Interestingly, partial U.S. military participation, supporting a regional humanitarian effort with naval or air forces, seems to fulfill all the requirements of the decision-making model.) However, from the United States's viewpoint, a massive participation in a humanitarian operation in the ex-Yugoslavian territories does not seem prudent at this time.

Considering the option of participating in a massive *peacekeeping* or *law and order* operation, and assuming a *clearcut goal definition* was found which allowed for NCA consensus, it seems unlikely that the mission would receive

the support of Congress and, hence, the *domestic populace*.<sup>16</sup> Without their support, the decision-making model concludes that "nooperation" is prudent.

## E. CONCLUSIONS

Chapter II, *Typology of United Nations Military Operations*, examined the broad spectrum of military operations that may be conducted under the auspices of the United Nations. Each different level presented--level 1, *humanitarian aid*; level 2, *separation of forces*; level 3, *law and order*; level 4, *use of limited force*; level 5, *enforcement*; and level 6, *punishment for violations of agreements/resolutions*--has unique implications for the decision-maker. These implications have complicated the decision-making process since the inception of the United Nations and will continue to limit any U.S. military activity under its auspices.

As a rule, the operations at the extremes of the spectrum (*humanitarian aid, enforcement and punishment for violations of agreements/resolutions*), offer the United States and other permanent members of the Security Council the best opportunities for direct military participation. The legal, moral and psychological aspects of intervention

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<sup>16</sup> For an entertaining examination of events leading to congressional support for Desert Storm, please refer to Bob Woodward's The Commanders (Ref. 34).

are less relevant; additionally, the extreme examples of United Nations intervention offer the United States a better opportunity to define clearly a goal for the operation.

When the role of the military is located somewhere between these extremes, action by secondary industrialized powers is probably more appropriate and the use of the U.S. military should be reconsidered. Besides having the experience and culture associated with peacekeeping operations, the secondary industrialized powers likely will not be perceived as having neo-colonialist or imperialist ambitions by most of the General Assembly.

Chapter III, *Model for U.S. Decision-Making*, provides a model to consider whether a given scenario is best handled by a collective or unilateral security operation. The United Nations is the focus of this study; an examination of regional security organizations is beyond its scope. However, this study's criteria are universal enough to determine whether a given regional security organization should act upon a crisis.

It would be naive indeed to assert that this crude model accounts for every factor involved in an intervention decision. Military activity does not occur in a vacuum; diplomatic and legal proceedings also play a vital role. [Ref. 35; 16] Much has been written about the missions of the U.S. military, and much has been written about U.N.

peacekeeping operations. But comparatively little literature exists on the relationship between the United States and United Nations collective security operations. This study's decision-making model, as illustrated by the Iraqi and Yugoslavian examples, provides a link between the United States and United Nations. Additionally, this study provides a base upon which future academics may build, particularly in the next chapter which will examine the potential roles of the U.S. Navy in United Nations operations.

#### IV. THE U.S. NAVY IN UNITED NATIONS OPERATIONS

Increasingly, U.S. forces will be called upon to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief both at home and abroad. As one of the few nations in the world with the means to rapidly and effectively respond to disaster, many nations depend on us for assistance.

Colin Powell, 1992

Earlier, this study concluded that the more moderate United Nations military requirements are best filled by moderate powers, and it is in the United States's best interests to participate--when participating at all--in the extreme forms of United Nations military operations: humanitarian aid and resolution enforcement/punishment. Interestingly, the U.S. Navy is uniquely suited to participate in these types of operations. In general, the U.S. Navy's potential role in United Nations operations may be separated into three categories: logistics support, enforcement of sanctions, and participation in punitive measures.

Before discussing these categories, however, it is important to note several presumptions this study makes regarding naval forces and the United Nations. First, for the foreseeable future, it is unlikely that there will be a standing United Nations naval force. As noted in one of the interviews conducted for this study, although the Soviet



Union and the Russian Federation apparently have made informal overtures to the United States regarding collective naval operations, for the time being these are not supported by the United States for many reasons, not least being the immense expense that would burden the United States's budget. [Ref. 37]

#### A. LOGISTICS SUPPORT

Traditionally, one of the primary missions of the U.S. Navy has been sea control, keeping the sea lines of communication open. The massive military-industrial potential of the United States's helping its allies halt (or contain) the advance of an enemy force ensured victory in World War II and contributed to victory in the Cold War.

While the problems of maintaining this traditional form of sea control have become less worrisome in recent years, in the context of United Nations operations, sea control remains important, albeit in an altered form. Whereas the historical meaning of sea control implied *command of the sea*, in other words being able to extend a force over great distances and wide areas, in the future sea control may come to mean extending the U.S. force over *time*. "The idea of majestically sweeping and commanding the seas has passed. . . . [However,] exerting temporary control (air, submarine and surface) in an area while moving ships into

position to project power ashore or to resupply overseas forces" [Ref. 35; 118] is precisely the type of operation required by United Nations forces engaged in either level 5 or level 6 operations. The reason "U.N. 'emergency' forces tend to become semipermanent is because there are so many semipermanent emergencies." [Ref. 30; 20] Therefore, naval forces are well-suited to maintain a long-term continuous presence in a region not yet ready (or no longer appropriate) for traditional forms of peacekeeping.

Regarding the three types of humanitarian assistance--host nation's extending the invitation for assistance, assistance given against the wishes of host, and where civil authority has evaporated--this study concluded that only in the first case should the U.S. deploy ground forces. However, it is conceivable that participation in any of the three categories could require a standby naval force to protect humanitarian efforts, including those of the International Red Cross. And, although ground forces seem best deployed only when there is an invitation for assistance, naval forces are suited for involvement in circumstances that are less than ideal. As Resolution 713 (1991) on Yugoslavia notes, if the Security Council's "primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations [is] for the maintenance of international peace and security," [Ref. 38; 1] and, if threats to peace and

security may include those not specifically relating to a nation's sovereignty, then that responsibility also includes all "practical steps to tackle the critical needs of the people of Yugoslavia, including displaced persons and the most vulnerable groups affected by the conflict(.)"<sup>17</sup> [Ref. 39; 3] The current United Nations Security Council debate on providing "all means necessary" for humanitarian efforts suggests naval forces already have an important role to play in interventionist humanitarian efforts planned under United Nations auspices. One can easily project a future when the "all means necessary" include not only naval support for humanitarian efforts, but also providing able bodies for "hands on" assistance on land. In this event, it seems U.S. Navy personnel should--like their ground force counterparts--only participate when the host government has extended an invitation for assistance.

During Desert Shield and Storm, U.S. naval forces were ready to provide vital escort to Military Sealift Command (MSC) units to ensure the arrival of supplies necessary for the collective security effort. Furthermore, naval forces

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<sup>17</sup> This is quoted from Security Council Resolution 724 (1991), adopted on 15 December 1991 in response to Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar's 11 December report which concluded that the conditions for establishing a peacekeeping operation in disintegrating Yugoslavia did not yet exist. In other words, although the disputants were not ready to allow for peacekeeping, the Security Council was beginning to pave the way for human rights efforts.

can support units furnishing humanitarian aid in crisis areas. Not only able to respond quickly to emerging crises, U.S. Navy assets are uniquely able to maintain a continuous presence in virtually any littoral area in order to provide logistics support for a humanitarian or combat effort, as well as provide the teeth required to put a bite into United Nations's resolutions involving arms embargoes or sanctions.

#### **B. ENFORCEMENT OF SANCTIONS**

In this study's decision-making model, there was a distinction made between unilateral and collective security efforts. For the U.S. Navy, its assets are uniquely prepared to act in both security categories. Because of the nature of naval warfare, sovereign nations' ships (for instance, two destroyers, one a Sovremennyy and the other a Spruance) are readily identifiable as belonging to a specific nation-state. Of course, with patrol craft and other smaller units that may be the main actors in a littoral/regional conflict, identification is more difficult. But even with the proliferation of small and inexpensive coastal defense platforms to many third world countries, quick and accurate visual recognition of nation-state naval combatants is easily conducted with little prior

training.<sup>18</sup> In other words, naval warfare under a collective umbrella still retains a uniquely large amount of "unilateralness."

The *Foundations and Principles* portion of the current National Military Strategy of the United States highlights the following dilemma:

"While we emphasize multinational operations under the auspices of international bodies such as the United Nations, we must retain the capability to act unilaterally when and where U.S. interests dictate. This new strategy is, in many ways, more complex than the containment strategy of the Cold War era." [Ref. 40; 6]

If flexibility is the key to acting correctly in this complex era, then naval forces are uniquely flexible. While efforts are occurring to garner domestic and international consensus for an operation, naval forces are able to arrive on station rapidly and then await either unilateral or collective action without having to change drastically the nature of their mission. Besides being able to conduct unilateral or collective missions, naval forces are also flexible in the types of operations to be conducted. For

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<sup>18</sup> Recognition of surface platforms is simpler and easier than of ground hardware or even aircraft. In addition to having identifying features inherent to the platform itself, naval units legally must fly a national flag or naval ensign. While aircraft and ground hardware have identifying markings, these are often difficult to observe due to camouflage and limited lines-of-sight.



example, naval forces currently located in the Adriatic not only are able to participate in the arms embargo of Yugoslavia under Resolution 713 (1991) [Ref. 38; 3], but with relatively little effort they also may participate in operations resulting from new Security Council resolutions concerning interventionist humanitarianism.

In Navies and Foreign Policy, Ken Booth discusses the flexibility (in his terms, "ambiguity") of maintaining a naval presence overseas:

Certainly in any relationship between a relatively stronger and a relatively weaker state, the weaker always faces the difficulty of trying to disassociate the promise of possible benefits, the threat of possible sanctions, or a danger of a withdrawal of support. . . . [This is due to] the relative subtlety of the stages through which a warship can be transformed from a platform for a dance-band and cavorting local dignitaries, to a haven of refuge for nationals in distress, to a gun-platform for shore bombardment. [Ref. 35; 27]

He considers this ambiguity a potential problem; in collective security operations, when escalation of a crisis may require an international consensus not yet possible, a unilateral naval presence can fulfill multiple missions before these missions are even openly articulated.

### **C. PUNITIVE MEASURES**

Naval forces are uniquely capable of participating in the full range of punitive uses of collective force, from

conducting a single air strike or Tomahawk launch to participating in the all-out invasion of a nation. If the biggest threat currently facing the United States is "the unknown, the uncertain(,)" [Ref. 40; 4] then it is a good bet that the future environment in which military operations occur will likely not be as clearcut as Desert Shield and Storm. While, at least according to *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, fears of a regional crisis vertically and horizontally escalating into a global nuclear conflagration are lower than at any time since World War II, still a local crisis could conceivably escalate up the ladder of operations discussed in Chapter II of this study. For example, a failed level 2 *separation of forces* operation could result in hostilities that require a level 3 *law and order* operation by United Nations forces. Successive miscues or failures could eventually lead to level 6 *punishment* operations. With a little imagination, one may even envision a scenario in which deploying additional United Nations forces to an area could lead to an inadvertent escalation of a local conflict. However, naval forces, especially U.S. Navy forces with a history of forward presence and routine operations in an area, may be deployed to a region without unduly escalating the level of the conflict. As stated in the National Military Strategy of the United States, "Forward presence forces conducting

operational and training deployments are often the most responsive in cases of natural disaster or regional crisis." [Ref. 40; 14] Likewise, additional naval forces, under the guise of an exercise or turnover operation also may be deployed with relatively little evidence of escalation.

A final point on the utility of naval forces in collective security operations is that the *risk* in using naval forces, typically at a standoff distance from land hostilities, is much lower than in using ground forces or even aircraft. Perhaps the image from Desert Storm that will last longest in the minds of national and international decision-makers is of a Tomahawk cruise missile effortlessly flying down the center of an Iraqi street, untouched, on target, and with no potential loss of American lives.

To illustrate the difficulties inherent in risking the use of force within a collective security operation, this study will use Donald Nuechterlein's "National Interest Matrix," (Figure 4.1) that separates the intensity of national interests into four categories: *survival*, *vital*, *major*, and *peripheral*. [Ref. 41; 29]

A *survival interest* "exists when the physical existence of a country is in jeopardy . . . ." A *vital interest* exists "when serious harm to the nation would result unless strong measures, including the use of force, are employed to protect the interest." [ref. 41; 29] In his terms, *major*

## NUECHTERLEIN'S NATIONAL INTEREST MATRIX

Intensity of Interest				
Basic Interest at Stake	Survival	Vital	Major	Peripheral
Defense of Homeland				
Economic Well-being				
Favorable World Order				
Promotion of Values				

**Figure 4.1**

and *peripheral interests* are such that some of the country's well-being or interests are at stake, but the use of armed force "is not deemed necessary to avoid adverse outcomes."  
[Ref. 41; 29]

Historically, the vast majority of United Nations military efforts have concerned the United States's major or peripheral interests but not its survival or vital interests. Now, it appears that the United States will be playing a more active role in these military operations. Therefore, it is perhaps most appropriate to use naval forces, minimizing the risks to U.S. military personnel

while also remaining a responsible partner in the collective security arena.

#### **D. CONCLUSIONS**

Although it appears that the vast majority of United Nations operations do not directly affect the United States's survival or vital interests, simultaneously the country is examining potentially new roles for its military in the collective security arena. The U.S. Navy is particularly suited to conduct a variety of operations within the United Nations framework, including logistics support, enforcement of sanctions, and participation in punitive measures. Moreover, the use of naval force minimizes risk, which is especially important when the operations are only of major or peripheral interest to the country; reduces the possibility of inadvertent escalation; and transitions easily between unilateral and collective operations.

If the threat is "instability and being unprepared to handle a crisis or war that no one predicted or expected," [Ref. 41; 4] then it seems that the United States, as the only nation with the military capability to influence events globally, must remain capable of reacting quickly and effectively to regional crises. The U.S. Navy, with its forward presence overseas, is uniquely capable of responding



even when a large-scale United Nations military operation is not necessary or possible. Current plans for stationing 2,100 U.S. Marines off Somalia to support the international relief effort is a perfect example.

Similarly, the U.S. intelligence community may play an increasing role in collective security operations. The next chapter examines the implications of the intelligence community's participation in the spectrum of United Nations military operations.

## V. U.S. INTELLIGENCE'S ROLE IN U.N. OPERATIONS

The unprecedented scope and pace of change in today's world--and the increasing number of actors now able to threaten global peace--highlight the need for reliable information and a sophisticated understanding of events and trends. The global reach of American intelligence capabilities is a unique national asset, crucial not only to our own security, but also to our leadership role in responding to international challenges.

President Bush, 1991

In his National Security Strategy of the United States:

1991-1992, President Bush briefly discusses intelligence programs. He outlines several important issues:

the turbulence of change itself demands that we monitor events and assess prospects for the future . . . regional turmoil will place growing burdens on intelligence collection, processing and analysis. At the same time, we must track the threats posed by narcotics trafficking, terrorism and the proliferation of advanced weapons. We must also be more fully aware of international financial, trade and technology trends that could affect the security of the United States, including its economic well-being. [Ref. 1; 63]

Monitoring political and military events to encourage regional stability may be the types of missions envisioned by the drafters of the *Charter of the United Nations*. However, as mentioned earlier, the threats to stability appear to be changing toward those that transcend not only sovereign borders, but also military affairs. It is

interesting to note that virtually all of the threats President Bush mentions at the top of this chapter are non-military matters. Narcotics trafficking and the proliferation of advanced weapons may be considered largely economic issues, as are the financial, trade and technology trends; terrorism arguably is a political issue (or at least an untraditional military issue). Considering that Third World nations are most concerned with foreign intrusion into their domestic economic and political affairs and the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council are probably most concerned with compliance and verification of resolutions, the essential dilemma concerning collective intelligence efforts is quite understandable. [Ref. 42; 2]

From the viewpoint of the United States, using a sovereign or unilateral intelligence capability in a way that jeopardizes its national security interests is highly unlikely to occur. Likewise, giving up national control of U.S. intelligence assets to an international intelligence organization also seems highly unlikely. Therefore, just as this study presumes that no international standing force of troops will be initiated, so too this study presumes that any attempt to initiate an international intelligence agency, something along the lines of the International Atomic Energy Agency, is at best a distant possibility.

For the purposes of this study, the six levels of United Nations military operations, ranging in intensity from humanitarian aid to enforcement of United Nations Security Council resolutions and punishment, also will be used to examine the potential multinational uses of U.S. intelligence assets. In general, it appears that the reasons the U.S. military should not involve itself in level 2 through level 4 United Nations operations (level 2, *separation of forces*; level 3, *law and order*; and level 4, *use of limited force*) become muddled when considering U.S. intelligence operations. On one hand, there are numerous reasons the United States can defend the use of its national intelligence assets for a multinational audience in a variety of operations. First, as mentioned, "secondary" sorts of military operations seem best suited for "secondary" powers; however, "secondary" powers do not have the intelligence collection capabilities of the United States. Second, if the primary reason the United States does not desire to participate in a collective security operation is that the risk is too high for the major or peripheral interests at stake, then "space-based systems, high above the earth . . . can carry out surveillance tasks quickly, effectively and efficiently with little risk, even in a crisis." [Ref. 43; 101]

On the other hand, there seem equally as many valid reasons for the United States not to provide information to an international audience. For example, if the primary reason the United States does not participate in a United Nations military action is due to fears of a Third World backlash against "Big Brother" neo-colonialist intervention, then providing overhead intelligence collection for the United Nations may be perceived as even more interventionist than sending ground troops. Currently, however, precedents set with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the U.N. Special Commission on Iraq suggest the United States intelligence community can safely share classified information and equipment (including a U-2) on a case-by-case basis, provided the heads of such international agencies remain discreet about their use. Ambassador Rolf Ekeus is the executive chairman of the Special Commission on Iraq, the United Nations organization mandated to oversee the implementation of the Security Council's Gulf War ceasefire resolutions calling for the elimination of Iraq's nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles with ranges over 150 kilometers, along with production capabilities. In a recent interview, he stated,

We have to verify that permitted activities, whether in the civil industry or the military, are not used as cover for the development of prohibited weapons. And we



will have means for that. There will be high-altitude observation, with the help of our U-2 aircraft.  
[Ref. 44; 8]

Interestingly, his statement suggests other, unstated means of intelligence support to the commission.

As a means to verify arms control agreements and Security Council resolutions, overhead intelligence systems have already proved to be invaluable. Space-based intelligence platforms can lend a certain amount of stability and assurance, especially in areas of chronic tension. Such capabilities can also reduce the possibilities of surprise attack and thus reduce the tendencies towards escalation of crises. Therefore, in a future where the United Nations is likely to take a more proactive role in ensuring regional stability, coalition forces undoubtedly will employ the entire spectrum of intelligence assets as force multipliers for their forces conducting level 1 through level 6 operations.

The levels of conflict (level 1, *humanitarian aid*; level 5, *enforcement*; and level 6, *punishment for violations of agreements/resolutions*), in which the U.S. military already has risked ground forces, will continue to be suited for the multilateral sharing of U.S. intelligence assets. But, as a rule, those intelligence missions that intrude into a sovereign nation's economic and political concerns seem best

suited to the U.S.'s unilateral monitoring and not a collective effort. Multinational intelligence efforts, especially in this era of "the proliferation of space-based surveillance" systems [ref. 43; 94], while potentially lucrative, require strict consideration of the implications of the effort. Publicity and media coverage are two factors that are likely to increase when national intelligence disseminates to an international audience. Moreover, the possibility that an intelligence source will be compromised is also likely to grow--although, regarding data received from overhead sensors, compromise of a source seems less relevant. (A human collecting information against a target nation seems easier to counter than an overhead sensor.) However, one may imagine that a target nation's knowledge of effective overhead intelligence monitoring by the U.S. or a multinational body could complicate future intelligence collection efforts against that target.

#### **A. HUMANITARIAN AID**

While intelligence assets--in particular, meteorological satellites--clearly have a role to play in providing warning of natural disasters, perhaps more importantly overhead sensors may be used for man-made environmental disasters. "With the decrease in tensions between the superpowers and the broadening of the definition of national security, their

national space assets may be increasingly diverted to monitor the environment, producing images of oil slicks, air pollution and natural disasters." [Ref. 43; 103] Several examples exist: the most obvious of which may be the Chernobyl incident, in which the United States, monitoring Soviet military and civilian communications and using satellite imagery, was "able to assess the extent of the damage to the Chernobyl reactor within hours of its detection." [Ref. 43; 103] Another example is the monitoring effort of the environmental damage resulting from the Gulf War.

#### **B. LEVEL 2 THROUGH LEVEL 4 OPERATIONS**

While it is unwise to say that the United States will never provide intelligence support to these mid-level operations, so too it seems unwise to predict that the U.S. should always provide information to operations sanctioned by the Security Council. Perhaps the most useful way to describe this category of intelligence sharing is that the United States must review this issue on a case-by-case basis. Means of deciding may be based on the relative merits of the case, the importance, capability and viability of the United States intelligence collection effort for a particular crisis, and the likelihood of source compromise.

Additionally, U.S. decision-makers may consider the

effects of intelligence dissemination on media coverage of the crisis and public support for the operation. As mentioned in Chapter III, international consensus is essential for the continuation of collective security operations, and information provided by the United States intelligence community may have a direct impact on the often fickle feelings of the international populace. For example, release of several violent Bomb Damage Assessment videotapes during the Gulf War actually helped allay public fears of unacceptable levels of collateral damage and civilian casualties. Similarly, information regarding Iraqi air activity may alter public perceptions of current U.S. and U.N. operations in the Arabian Gulf.

### **C. INTELLIGENCE AND U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS**

Level 5 *enforcement* and its follow-on, level 6 *punishment for violations of agreements*, do not seem to need a detailed discussion in this study except for a few points. Just as warriors through the ages have desired the advantages inherent in gaining the high ground, so too overhead intelligence assets may be the difference between defeat and victory. While a recent article that said the Gulf War "marks the first time American satellites have been placed on a wartime footing" [Ref. 43; 95] was perhaps forgetting the role played by the U.S. intelligence

community in operations from Vietnam to Just Cause, nevertheless, surveillance capabilities in space, combined with U.S. ground and air assets, did provide coalition forces a very great advantage over the Iraqis. The "largest fleet of watching satellites ever assembled" [Ref. 43; 95] constructed a web of sensors around and over Iraq, thereby creating a tripwire of warning and providing a highly effective force multiplier. The force multiplication effect of intelligence assets may be particularly crucial in future level 5 and level 6 United Nations military operations--especially considering the apparently inevitable disarmament pressures gaining momentum across the globe.

As in the past and present, the United Nations's future military operations necessarily will be constrained by moral issues. Therefore, a valuable lesson from the Gulf War is that the accuracy of precision-guided munitions such as the Tomahawk was due in no small part to extensive reconnaissance satellite imagery. This accuracy enabled coalition forces to limit the collateral damage to civilians in Iraq and Kuwait in some instances, "a very important political consideration during the air and land war." [Ref. 43; 96] Concurrently, the massive strategic bombing campaign severely disrupted the Iraqi infrastructure, an occurrence unlike any since World War II, the full effects of which are probably still not completely understood by



military planners. In any case, the extensive means allowed the coalition force seems highly unlikely to occur under future United Nations military operations. As Weiss and Chopra conclude, "Given the unexpected scale of the engagement that followed (the approval for allowing 'all necessary means'), it is unlikely that the international community will write another blank check of this kind." [Ref. 17; 29]

#### **D. CONCLUSIONS**

If the end of the zero-sum Cold War meant that "what was good for one superpower was no longer automatically considered bad for the other," [Ref. 45; 35] then the number of agreements concerning new United Nations's military operations is likely to grow. This chapter has already pointed out the importance of maintaining the high ground in military operations. In collective security operations, in which it is required that the multinational force be seen as a moral and humane force, it may be decisive that the force also maintains the moral "high ground." U.S. intelligence community participation in United Nations military operations can be a decisive factor in ensuring that international consensus does not ebb and that military operations are as efficient and humane as practical.

## VI. CONCLUSION

During the last half-century, the single applicable document most subscribed to by mankind has been represented by the United Nations Charter.

Martin van Creveld

While Mr. van Creveld may have been correct in his recent *Parameters* article, unfortunately the nearly half-century life of the United Nations has often been characterized by inactivity and stalemate. "Still, there were many occasions when the Council condemned aggression in general terms, ordered cease-fires (often with success), and sent armed forces operating under its auspices to observe and, as far as possible, enforce those cease-fires." [Ref. 45; 35] The rise to power in the Soviet Union of Mikhail Gorbachev, followed by the end of the Cold War, has led to a more multipolar world which, paradoxically, has made it more likely that Security Council consensus may be reached, except in circumstances which directly conflict with one of the permanent members' vital interests.

As the United Nations Security Council looks to resolve regional crises ranging from humanitarian issues to punitive measures resulting from the failure of a member nation to heed the Council's resolutions, the U.S. and its military

must consider the implications of its participation in these operations. The majority of United Nations member countries will continue to have a Third World perspective, wary of subtle (or not subtle) threats to their international prestige and national sovereignty, yet eager to achieve and maintain the stability needed for steady economic growth. For the U.S., the world's last remaining superpower, the situation may be especially tricky. While its role as the world's leader may indeed be, in President Bush's phrase, based on trust; it is also true that trust is as strong as the last time faith was put to the test. Therefore, it is imperative the United States, to maintain its position in the world, use its power prudently.

Prudent use of power means using power only when it is needed. For the United States, the primary military power in the world, this use of power means participating in United Nations operations only when primary power is needed. As mentioned in the introduction to this study, recent initiatives relating to Yugoslavia, Somalia and Cambodia point to a future that will include even more intense and varied United Nations military operations. This study began with a discussion of the six levels of U.N. military operations that follow:

1. Humanitarian Aid
2. Separation of Forces
3. Law and Order
4. Use of Limited Force
5. Enforcement
6. Punishment for Violations of Agreements/Resolutions

These levels, of course, will never be as clearcut in reality as they may seem on paper. The United States, with interests and obligations that span the globe, also may not always have the opportunity for clear distinctions in its military operations. In these "gray areas," in which the major or peripheral interests of the United States may not readily outweigh the risks involved, maximum flexibility in force applied seems vital. In these cases, it seems that using naval forces as a means to provide forward presence, symbolize political support and, at the same time, ensure a large degree of "unilateralness" to an operation will help make the best of a potentially disastrous situation. Regarding the sharing of intelligence, the United States seems best suited for providing information during operations in which it also plays an active role at the point of crisis: humanitarian operations and enforcement of and punishment for violating United Nations resolutions. During the mid-level operations, the rules are less clear.

Intelligence sharing requires a large degree of sophistication and discretion on the part of the international organization. Recent examples such as the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq provides a hopeful sign for the future. In any case, it seems prudent to review each future instance of intelligence sharing on a case-by-case basis.

The full impact of the Gulf War on the United Nations will be better understood in the future. Still, it seems apparent that this event "will one day be regarded, if not as a critical turning point, at any rate as a modest milestone on the highway of change." [Ref. 45; 36]

Traditionally, sovereign nations are often characterized by three powers: to impose taxes, to make law, and to make war. [Ref. 45] Taking a very long view, it is possible that these powers of the state may pass to an international organization such as the United Nations. However, it is a presumption of this study that any significant amendments to the *Charter of the United Nations* are beyond the horizon. Therefore, the United States's power in the organization will likely remain as is. In Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Powell's words, "While we emphasize multinational operations under the auspices of international bodies such as the United Nations, we must retain the



capability to act unilaterally when and where U.S. interests dictate." [Ref. 15; 6]

If the United States's new military strategy is built on the four foundations of Strategic Deterrence and Defense, Forward Presence, Crisis Response, and Reconstitution, which require "the capability and flexibility to support a spectrum of response options," [Ref. 15; 6] then this spectrum includes useful cooperation with the United Nations. Collective defense reduces the burdens of defense spending and unnecessary arms competitions, ensures continued ties with friends and allies, and helps reassure developing nations. Reusing Churchill's description of democracy, collective security may be "the worst possible mechanism for attempting to safeguard peace, except for all the others."

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